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The reliable supply of electricity over an electrical network is essential for modern so-
cieties. The electrical network is a complex grid connecting electric generation units, or
generators, with the consumers who use the energy to meet their daily needs. In order to
successfully provide electric energy to consumers each day, certain regulations are im-
plemented by the regional dispatcher of electricity to ensure its uninterrupted delivery
even if a mild contingency occurs. Unlike the electric energy consumed by each indi-
vidual consumer, which is a private good because consumers use and pay for exactly
what they use, the electric reliability supplied over the network is a public good. This is
because all consumers in a region receive the same level of electric reliability, no matter
how much electricity is individually consumed.
While the reliable supply of electricity is crucial, there is also serious concern about
the negative environmental impacts of the air pollution created by these generators. De-
pending on the type of air pollutant, it can have either a uniform or localized impact,
called global or criteria pollutants, respectively. Though global and criteria pollutants
impact the environment dierently, both have properties of public goods because all
consumers in the region aected by the pollutant receive the same level of air pollution,
no matter how much electricity is individually consumed. Further complicating the lay-
ering of environmental regulation on top of electric reliability regulation is that the path
of electricity over the network, the dispersion of global pollutants through the air, andthe dispersion of criteria pollutants through the air generally dier.
In order to explore the interactions of electric reliability and environmental regula-
tion, both a theoretical and numerical simulation framework is built. The main explo-
ration of the theoretical model is to compare, while considering electric reliability and
environmental pollution, the social welfare maximizing solution to the competitive mar-
ket solution. This is done to determine if competitive markets for electricity and either
global or criteria air pollutants can achieve the socially optimal solution.
In addition to the theoretical analysis, numerical simulations of a highly simpliﬁed
electricity network and airshed for Northeastern North America are built. The model
is exercised under varying combinations of variables in order to test the practical sig-
niﬁcance of the theoretical results. The adjustment of the model variables allows for
meaningful research in two primary areas. The ﬁrst area is understanding the policy
impacts of environmental regulation, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI), when faced with various constraints on the electric grid, such as a required
reserve margin. The second area is to study varying methodological practices for mod-
eling the electric grid by comparing alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC)
simulation results and the eect of their dierent estimates of line constraints based
upon both thermal load and voltage level.
The results of the theoretical analysis lead to the conclusion that after assuming a
central planner has set variables surrounding the transmission grid, complicating in-
terdependencies in markets for criteria pollutants make achieving the socially optimal
solution unlikely. Markets for global pollutants can more easily achieve the socially
optimal solution due to the lack of these interdependencies.
The numerical simulations demonstrate a major issue that can arise in attempts to
regulate air pollution on a regional basis in a policy such as the RGGI. “Leakage” occurs
when the cost of generating electricity to pollution emitting generators in the regionswhere air pollution regulation applies is increased, inducing larger imports of electricity
from external unregulated regions that do not face the same emission cost. The resulting
outcome may diminish the eectiveness of the regulation in reducing pollution or, in the
worst case, increase total emissions. The outcome of the simulations shows that leakage
is a major concern for the RGGI’s ability to reduce net emissions.
The numerical simulations also demonstrate that the outcomes critically depend on
the methodology used in solving the system. Both a DC approximation of the actual AC
system (ﬂows are modeled by linear equations in a DC network) and the more realistic
non-linear AC network that includes constraints on voltage levels (a public good that in
reality must be kept within bounds) are modeled. In addition, the electric transmission
power constraints are relaxed to examine their importance. The dierence in complexity
between AC modeling and DC modeling as well as transmission constraints become
especially important when the network is operated at high prices for the regulated air
pollutants, causing signiﬁcant changes to the mix of the fuel type used by dispatched
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xiCHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The consumption of electricity is an essential part of everyday modern life. Unfortu-
nately, most large electric generation units, or generators, use a fuel source that emits
pollutants, such as carbon dioxide (CO2), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and nitrogen oxides
(NOx), as well as ﬁne particulate matter that are not completely captured by existing
emission reduction technologies. CO2 is a heat-trapping greenhouse gas (GHG) con-
tributing to global climate change [21]. The emission of a GHG acts like a pure public
“bad” because no matter where it is emitted, the adverse eect on the planet’s atmo-
sphere is more or less equal. Therefore, GHG pollutants are global pollutants.
SO2 and NOx are two of the six air pollutants the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) call criteria pollutants [26]. SO2 contributes to respiratory illness,
aggravates existing heart and lung diseases, the formation of acid rain, and atmospheric
particulate matter that causes reduced visibility [25]. NOx are a main ingredient in
ground level ozone, which causes adverse respiratory eects [22]. Because, the emis-
sion of these criteria pollutants are dispersed non-uniformly according to weather and
topographic conditions, thereby aecting humans dierently at dierent locations, they
are local public “bads.” Nevertheless, the varying levels of potential harm to people can
be predicted, given the speciﬁc generator information (e.g. location, stack height, and
pollutant emissions), weather patterns, and topography.
The electric power industry has been a major contributor to the production of all of
these pollutants. In 2007, the generation of electricity was the single largest source of
CO2 emissions in the United States, representing 40 percent of all CO2 emissions [27].
In 2002, the fuel combustion of electric utilities created 70 percent of the SO2 emissions
(the largest source) and 20 percent of the NOx emissions (the second largest source)
1produced in the United States [24, 23].
To date, eorts to reduce CO2 emissions in the United States have been left for in-
dividual states to implement, as the federal government has not taken a leadership role
beyond deliberations in the legislature. Multiple regional programs have been discussed
across the country, including the Western Climate Initiative and the Midwestern Green-
house Gas Reduction Accord. The only state-led program to become a reality has been
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cap and trade program developed by
ten Northeastern and mid-Atlantic states. The most current federal legislation being
considered is the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACESA).
Eorts to reduce SO2 and NOx emissions were made by the federal government with
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. This legislation created an Acid Rain program
that authorized a cap and trade system of SO2 emissions as well as placed a limit on
generation unit emissions of NOx. The EPA issued the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR)
in early 2005 as an eort to better control and further reduce pollution that crosses state
borders. Though the more stringent proposed CAIR regulation was vacated in 2008,1
both SO2 and NOx are currently regulated by cap and trade programs.
In addition, the infrastructure that transports electricity to each consumer is essen-
tial to its reliable delivery. Due to economies of scale for the generation of electricity,
there is an incentive to build large generation units. Because of the diculty in situ-
ating those large generators near residential consumers, the electricity must be shipped
long distances. But, the electric lines, each with its own scale economies and carrying
capacity, limit the routes electricity can ﬂow from each generator to reach customers.
The lack of ecient storage of electricity ampliﬁes these limitations. Furthermore, to
maintain service reliability, parallel routes are usually established for transmission lines.
1A similar program focusing on mercury emissions, the Clean Air Mercury Rule, was also vacated in
2008.
2The path electricity takes along the network is governed solely by the laws of physics,
not by contracts for generation and delivery. The ability for electricity to be supplied
without surprised interruption, in other words electric reliability, is also a public good
even though the consumption of electricity is a private good. Electric reliability is a pub-
lic good because all consumers in a region receive the same level of electric reliability,
no matter how much electricity is individually consumed. No single consumer has the
incentive to honestly reveal his or her desire for reliable service, which is provided by
installing redundant and excess capacity. Each individual can “free-ride” on the spare
capacity demanded by others. In addition, the drastic over- or under-consumption of
electricity by any individual would cause the electric grid to go down for everyone.
Nevertheless, electric reliability has a value to all consumers, which is likely dierent
for each consumer, making demand revelation dicult.
The interaction of environmental and electric reliability regulation is further compli-
cated because often the geographical responsibilities of these two regulatory agencies
do not completely intersect. Thus, the challenge to set optimal standards is increased as
more parties are involved. There is a growing importance in the relationship between
environmental and electric reliability agencies, as evidenced by a statement by the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)2 in late 2008.
The NERC Planning Committee (PC) has identiﬁed initiatives currently un-
derway to address climate change and reduce GHG emissions as among the
most important emerging issues facing the reliability of the bulk power sys-
tem over the coming years [15].
The relationships between global impacts of GHG emissions, locational impacts
of criteria pollutants, and the physical constraints of the electrical grid have been well-
2The entity that sets electric reliability standards in North America.
3studied by others, such as Talaq et al. [18]. However, unlike other work on this topic, the
theoretical model presented here includes electric reliability as a variable in the model
and takes a utility function-based approach. The main exploration of the theoretical
model is to compare, while considering electric reliability and environmental pollution,
the social welfare maximizing solution to the competitive market solution. This is done
to determine if competitive markets for electricity and either global or criteria air pollu-
tants can achieve the socially optimal solution.
In addition to the theoretical analysis, numerical simulations of a highly simpliﬁed
electricity network and airshed for Northeastern North America are built. The model
is exercised under varying combinations of variables in order to test the practical sig-
niﬁcance of the theoretical results. The adjustment of the model variables allow for
meaningful research in two primary areas. The ﬁrst area is understanding the policy
impacts of environmental regulation, such as the RGGI, when faced with various con-
straints on the electric grid, such as a required reserve margin. The second area is to
study varying methodological practices for modeling the electric grid by comparing al-
ternating current (AC) and direct current (DC) simulation results as well as to examine
line constraints.
The primary policy focus in the numerical simulations is the RGGI. Scenarios are
created to compare, for example, electricity prices, industry proﬁts, and the use of each
major fuel type, both with and without the RGGI imposed on generators. One of the
main focuses of these RGGI simulations is to examine the amount of emissions “leak-
age” that will occur. Leakage refers to the increased emissions from generators outside
of a regulated region as a result of the increased marginal operating cost for generators
inside a regulated region. This is of particular concern because leakage could poten-
tially partially, or completely, oset the emission reductions from inside the regulated
4area with increased emissions from outside the regulated area. Furthermore, numerical
simulations considering the presence of a drought and operating reserve margins in light
of the RGGI are also considered. The purpose in modeling a drought is to examine the
potential for permit price volatility under a cap and trade program. A drought reduces
hydropower, therefore increasing the need for CO2-emitting generation and the price
of emission permits. Operating reserves are important because they provide electric
reliability, a crucial feature to any modern electric power system.
Numerical simulations are also conducted to explore methodological practices for
modeling the electric grid. Actual power systems are AC networks. Thousands of con-
straints on ﬂow, voltage, stability, and power production, many of which are non-linear,
govern the operation of such a network. However, realistic modeling of power networks
is challenging. Because of the complexity of creating and solving a realistic AC power
system model, simpler models have been used instead, including DC models that are lin-
ear approximations of the AC model. Therefore, both AC and DC models are simulated
in order to draw comparisons between the two models.
Furthermore, the characteristics of an electric power network can strongly inﬂuence
the eects of environmental policies that are applied to the power sector. The ﬂows
in such a network do not follow the shortest or most under-utilized route from where
powerisgeneratedtowhereitisconsumed, ratherﬂowsfollowlawsofphysicsknownas
Kircho’s Laws. So, scenarios both enforcing and relaxing transmission line constraints
are executed in order to examine the importance of such constraints.
Chapter 2 reviews the RGGI because it is a major driver for both the theoretical
model and numerical simulations. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical model and re-
sults. Section 3.1 provides an overview of the theoretical analysis. Section 3.2 sets up
the model by outlining the variables that are used. In order to isolate the impacts of
5each pollutant with reliability, the global and criteria pollutants are modeled separately
with reliability. Section 3.3 begins the theoretical modeling by considering only elec-
tric reliability. Section 3.4 summarizes the results of Section 3.3. Section 3.5 builds on
Section 3.3 by adding a global pollutant to the model. Section 3.6 replaces the global
pollutant from Section 3.5 with a criteria pollutant. Section 3.7 summarizes the results
from both Sections 3.5 and 3.6.
Chapter 4 presents the numerical simulation model and results. Section 4.1 provides
an overview of the numerical simulations. Section 4.2 sets up the model by outlining
the variables that are used. Section 4.3 discusses the underlying consumer demand,
transmissionlinedatacharacteristics, andgeneratorcharacteristicsusedinthenumerical
simulations. Section 4.4 outlines the optimization formulation solved in each of the
numerical simulations. Section 4.5 examines the policy and methodology results of the
numerical simulations. Chapter 5 summarizes the key points of the theoretical model
and numerical simulations and outlines areas for future research.
6CHAPTER 2
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE
The RGGI is a cap and trade regulation on CO2 emissions that has been approved by
and is operative in ten Northeastern and mid-Atlantic states: Maine, New Hampshire,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Maryland,
and Delaware, as shown in Figure 2.1 [13].
Figure 2.1: RGGI participating states
In this study, the RGGI is the focus for four primary reasons. First, an existing
network model is available for the electricity system in Northeastern North America
thatcanbeusedtoexploremanyissuesthathavebeenraisedconcerningCO2 regulation.
Second, theRGGIistheonlyofthestate-driveninitiativestocometofruition. Third, the
7RGGI only regulates a portion of the United States and the boundaries of the regulated
area do not exactly coincide with electric reliability control areas. Fourth, the RGGI has
borders with portions of the United States and Canada that do not have CO2 regulations
currently in place.
The ten states in the RGGI contain 16 percent of the United States population [9],
but emit only ten percent of United States GHG emissions. This is in part because the
RGGI area’s electricity generation mix uses relatively more natural gas and less coal
than some other areas, such as Pennsylvania, a state not participating in the RGGI.
The objective of the RGGI is to reduce electric power sector CO2 emissions by
ten percent from a baseline level, calculated to be four percent more than the average
regional emissions during the period of 2000–2004, by 2018. This reduction is achieved
by capping emissions at the baseline level for the ﬁrst six years of the program, 2009–
2014, and then reducing the cap by 2.5 percent of the baseline in each of the next four
years.
The main highlight of the RGGI is that each of the states participating in the pro-
gram has agreed to auction a large fraction of the CO2 allowances. This is unlike other
CO2 cap and trade programs like the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme that
distributed the vast majority of CO2 allowances without charge to emitting generators.
Though 25 percent of a state’s allocation of CO2 allowances is the minimum agreed
upon number of CO2 allowances to auction, multiple states are on track to sell nearly
100 percent of their CO2 allowances via auction. As a group, approximately 80 percent
of the annual budget of roughly 188 million CO2 allowances are projected to be sold via
auction. Furthermore, each of the auctions conducted has a reserve price — a minimum
price for which a CO2 allowance will be sold (set to be $1.86 per CO2 allowance at the
start of the program).
8The ﬁrst four of the quarterly scheduled auctions have been completed and all CO2
allowances were sold. In particular, CO2 allowances from the 2009 allocation year have
had the following auction results [17].
 12,565,387 sold at $3.07 per CO2 allowance (September 25, 2008)
 31,505,898 sold at $3.38 per CO2 allowance (December 17, 2008)
 31,513,765 sold at $3.51 per CO2 allowance (March 18, 2009)
 30,887,620 sold at $3.23 per CO2 allowance (June 17, 2009)
The proceeds of the CO2 allowance auctions will be used for consumer beneﬁt, as deter-
mined by each of the participating states, by funding projects and programs for energy
eciency and clean energy technology.
Another feature of the RGGI is that generators only have to demonstrate that they
hold enough CO2 allowances to meet their CO2 emissions every three years. Also,
osets that are of the RGGI’s speciﬁed type and geographic scope can be used to fulﬁll
up to 3.3 percent of a compliance obligation. The RGGI does have provisions in place
that allow the control period to be extended (to a fourth year) and the oset amount (ten
percent) and geographic scope to be expanded if the per CO2 allowance price is above
$10 (in 2005 dollars) for a long enough period of time. Lastly, an unlimited number
of CO2 allowances can be banked for future use (though CO2 allowances cannot be
borrowed from future years) as the CO2 allowances in the RGGI do not expire.
Though the RGGI is the only cap and trade program for CO2 emissions to be imple-
mented in the United States, other programs are currently in discussion. At the Federal
level, United States Representatives Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Edward Markey (D-
MA) propose to reduce United States GHG emissions via the ACESA. This bill passed
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Figure 2.2: ACESA target GHG emissions
Figure 2.3: GHG emissions of regional cap and trade initiatives
10the House of Representatives by a vote of 219 to 212 on June 26, 2009 [19]. The pro-
posed emission reductions of the ACESA are shown in Figure 2.2 [11].
In addition to the proposed Federal legislation, state-driven initiatives to reduce
GHG emissions are also underway in the Western Climate Initiative and Midwestern
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord. In total, the states participating in each of the three
programs depicted in Figure 2.3 [5]1 comprise 37 percent of United States emissions.
1“[Greenhouse gas] emissions from Canadian Provinces participating in the Midwest Accord and
[Western Climate Initiative] are not included here. MtCO2e is million metric tons of carbon dioxide
equivalent per year. Percentages are total of U.S. emissions.”
11CHAPTER 3
WHEN THE TRANSPORT PATHS OF COMMODITIES AND THE
EXTERNALITIES THEY GENERATE DIVERGE: ELECTRICITY AS AN
EXAMPLE
3.1 Overview of Theoretical Analysis
The theoretical model presented in this chapter closely examines the interrelationship
between electric reliability and environmental pollution to determine if competitive mar-
kets for electricity and either global or criteria air pollutants can achieve the socially
optimal solution.
The methodology chosen to examine this question is to compare the solution reached
by a social planner who maximizes a generalized social welfare function to the optimal
result reached by each individual consumer if faced with a competitive market. This
methodology is executed three times. The ﬁrst use of the methodology compares the
socially optimal outcome to the market solution while solely focusing on electric reli-
ability. The second and third uses of the methodology include global and criteria air
pollutants, respectively.
3.2 Description of the Model
There are i = 1;:::;I locations, or buses, where each location is a node or connection
point in the transmission system. The physical relationship of these locations is assumed
to be small enough that each location faces the same electric reliability and that each lo-
cation has its own air quality due to criteria pollutant emissions and distribution patterns.
12An example of such a model size would be the New York City or Boston metropolitan
areas.
There is a single resource in the economy, with maximum availability G, that can be
used to produce electricity for consumption, electricity for electric reliability, mitigate
pollution, or produce all other goods that consumers value. When using the resource to
produce electricity for either consumption or electric reliability, both global and criteria
air pollutants are created.
At each location, there is one representative consumer, who is the aggregate rep-
resentation of all consumers at location i. Each representative consumer has utility
function ui that is dependent upon ﬁve variables: individual real electric power con-
sumption xi, individual consumption of all other goods yi (a use of G), the air quality at
all locations due to a global pollutant , the air quality at the consumer’s location due
to a criteria pollutant i, and the electric reliability of the bulk power electric system .
Each consumer’s utility is increasing in all of these variables. There is a social welfare
function W that weights each consumer’s utility.
Also at each location, there is at most one fossil-ﬁred generation unit that produces
electricity. Each generation unit transforms the resource used to generate electricity for
consumption, z
g
i (a use of G), into electricity, gi, by the function Ri, so gi = Ri(z
g
i). Simi-
larly, each generation unit transforms the resource used to be able to generate additional
electricity for electric reliability, zr
i (a use of G), into electricity, ri, by the same function
Ri, so ri = Ri(zr
i).
Electric reliability, , is modeled by requiring each generation unit to provide elec-
tric generation in addition to that which is needed to satisfy consumer demand. So, if
generation unit i is scheduled to produce gi units of electricity for consumers to use, it is
13required to produce an additional ri = gi units of electricity to satisfy electric reliability.
It isassumed that   0. Unlikethe unitsof electricitycreated for consumption, the units
of electricity created for electric reliability do not ﬂow over the transmission lines. This
construction of electric reliability is a simplifying qualitative assumption compared to
reality, where generators are paid in a separate market for making additional generating
capacity available, not additional electricity.
The exogenous variables Pmin
i and Pmax
i denote each generator’s upper and lower
electricity production bounds. The sum of generation of electricity used for consump-
tion and electric reliability must fall within these bounds.
At each generation unit, the emissions of the global pollutant are produced according
to the function e
i = E
i (gi;ri;w
i ), where w
i (a use of G) is the amount of the resource
used to reduce emissions of the global pollutant of the generator at location i. The emis-
sions of the criteria pollutant are produced according to the function e

i = E

i (gi;ri;w

i ),
where w

i is the amount of the resource used to reduce emissions of the criteria pollutant
of the generator at location i. The air quality at all locations caused by the global pollu-
tant is deﬁned by the function  = Q(e
1;:::;e
I) while the air quality at each location
caused by the criteria pollutant is deﬁned by the I functions i = Q

i (e

1;:::;e

I). By
substitution, functions A and  i are deﬁned as follows:
 = A(z
g
1;z
r
1;w

1;:::;z
g
I;z
r
I;w

I)  Q
(E

1(g1;r1;w
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I (gI;rI;w

I)) (3.1)
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I)); 8i (3.2)
The L electric transmission lines are modeled as a lossless DC system. Each of the
transmission lines has a maximum carrying capacity of electricity of Ml. The bus sus-
ceptance matrix, B, is a linear approximation of net power injections (from demand and
generation) at each bus as a function of voltage phase angles. The branch susceptance
14matrix, C, is a linear approximation of power ﬂows on each line as a function of voltage
phase angles. In the deﬁnitions of both B and C, voltage angle refers to the dierence
in the phase of the sinusoidal voltage at a bus, relative to the reference bus (bus 1 is
assumed to be the reference bus in this model).
It is assumed that the exogenously deﬁned consumer, generation, and transmission
line variables are deﬁned so that the electric grid operates competitively. Thus, it is
assumed that all prices are not subject to monopolist manipulation.
3.3 Electric Reliability
To begin, , the level of electric reliability provided for the entire electric system, is con-
sidered as a variable in the model while environmental pollution is added in subsequent
sections. Appendix A.1 provides the detailed mathematical results that are summarized
in this section.
153.3.1 Social Planner
The social planner solves the following social welfare maximization problem:
max
xi;yi;;
gi;ri;z
g
i ;zr
i;i
W(u1(x1;y1;);:::;uI(xI;yI;)) (3.3)
3 gi = Ri(z
g
i); 8i (3.4)
ri = Ri(z
r
i); 8i (3.5)
xi   gi =
I X
j=1
Bijj; 8i (3.6)
ri = gi; 8i (3.7)
I X
j=1
yj +
I X
j=1
z
g
j +
I X
j=1
z
r
j  G (3.8)
P
min
i  gi + ri  P
max
i ; 8i (3.9)
I X
j=1
Cljj  jMlj; 8l (3.10)
1 = 0 (3.11)
Objective function (3.3) is a generalized welfare function that accounts for the utility
of each consumer in the model. The utility of each consumer i is a function of their con-
sumption of electricity xi, all other goods yi, and the level of electric reliability provided
to all consumers in the model, .
Constraint (3.4) describes how the single resource in the economy is transformed
into electricity generated for consumption for each generation unit. Constraint (3.5) de-
scribes how the single resource in the economy is transformed into electric reliability
for each generation unit. Constraint (3.6) speciﬁes that the net power injection due to
demand and generation for consumption (but not for electric reliability) at each bus i
must be equal to the sum of all of the power injections used for electricity consump-
16tion coming from all other buses in the model to bus i. Constraint (3.7) deﬁnes the
relationship between the level of electric reliability chosen and the number of units of
electricity generated to meet that standard. Constraint (3.8) is the resource constraint,
requiring that total amount of the resource consumed for the generation of electricity for
consumption, generation of electricity for electric reliability, and all other goods does
not exceed the total availability of the resource. Constraint (3.9) requires that the sum of
electricity generated for consumption and electric reliability must be within each gener-
ation unit’s physical operating constraints. Constraint (3.10) requires that the amount of
electricity traveling over each transmission line does not exceed the physical carrying
capacity of that line. The maximum carrying capacity of each transmission line, Ml, is
expressed in an absolute value because electricity can ﬂow over a transmission line in
either direction between two buses, i and j. By construction of the model, one direction
of ﬂow is the “positive” direction (i.e. from bus i to bus j) and the other direction of ﬂow
is the “negative” direction (i.e. from bus j to bus i). Finally, constraint (3.11) sets the
voltage angle at bus 1, the reference bus, to a reference value of zero.
The results of this maximization yield that the following results must hold at an
optimal solution (an endogenous variable evaluated at its optimal solution is noted by
), where 
i are the I Lagrange multipliers for constraint (3.6), 
i are the I Lagrange
multipliers for constraint (3.7),  is the Lagrange multiplier for constraint (3.8), 
i
and 
i are the 2I Langrange multipliers for constraint (3.9), and 
l and 
l are the 2L
17Langrange multipliers for constraint (3.10):
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3.3.2 Individual Consumer
Consider the individual consumer’s perspective of a competitive market. Each individ-
ual consumer at location i solves the following utility maximization problem:
max
xi;yi;
ui(xi;yi;) (3.16)
3 ixi + yi + i  mi (3.17)
Objective function (3.16), is consumer i’s utility function. Constraint (3.17) is con-
sumer i’s budget constraint, where i is the price of electricity used for consumption to
consumer i,  is the cost of all other goods to all consumers, i is the price of electric
reliability for consumer i, and mi is consumer i’s wealth allocation, where mi is deﬁned
in terms of consumer i’s allocation of all other goods, ¯ yi, so that mi  ¯ yi.
In order for endogenous variables x
i, y
i, and  to be optimal, the following ﬁrst
18order conditions must be satisﬁed:
@ui()
@xi
@ui()
@yi
=
i

(3.18)
@ui()
@
@ui()
@yi
=
i

(3.19)
3.4 Electric Reliability Results
This section summarizes the results from the optimization problem that considers elec-
tric reliability, but not environmental pollutants.
3.4.1 Electricity Consumption and All Other Goods
Equations (3.12) and (3.18) are the same and require that, at an optimal solution, each
consumer’s marginal rate of substitution between the consumption of electricity and all
other goods must be equal to the price ratio of electricity produced for consumption and
all other goods. Each consumer’s optimal marginal rate of substitution is matched pair-
wise with its own price ratio. Therefore, consumption of electricity and all other goods
are private goods and a competitive market will yield the socially optimal outcome,
provided the socially desired allocation of welfare is given by an initial allocation of
income to each individual resulting in the desired outcome.
3.4.2 Electric Reliability
Equations (3.13) and (3.19) are not the same. Equation (3.13), the result from the social
planner’s maximization, requires that in order to set the optimal level of electric reliabil-
19itythateachconsumerreceives, thesumofeachconsumer’smarginalrateofsubstitution
between electric reliability and all other goods must be equated to the marginal cost of
its ecient production.
On the other hand, equation (3.19), the result from an individual consumer’s utility
maximization, requires that each consumer’s marginal rate of substitution between elec-
tric reliability and all other goods must be equal to the price ratio of electric reliability
and all other goods. Because a particular consumer’s marginal rate of substitution is
generally less than that of its sum over all consumers, too little electric reliability will
tend to be provided by a market mechanism without further government adjustment.
Therefore, electric reliability is a public good and a competitive market will not yield
the socially optimal outcome.
3.4.3 Electricity Generation
Equation (3.14) outlines the marginal rate of transformation between using the resource
for the production of electricity for consumption and electric reliability. The optimal
solution for each generator is dependent on the prices it faces for the production of
electricity and electric reliability, as well as the cost of transmission congestion and the
units’ physical limitations. Each generator’s optimal marginal rate of transformation
is matched pair-wise with its own prices. Therefore, electricity generation for both
consumption and reliability are private goods and a competitive market will yield the
socially optimal outcome, given that a regulatory authority establishes the optimal level
of electric reliability that generation units must provide.
203.4.4 Voltage Angles and the Transmission Grid
Equations (3.13), (3.14), and (3.15) all support the importance of a central planner, such
as a regional transmission organization (RTO), in dispatching the electric grid.
As described in Section 3.4.2, equation (3.13) highlights the public good nature of
electric reliability. The optimal provision of electric reliability will not be achieved
when left to a competitive market, hence the need of a central planner to estimate the
optimal value for all consumers.
Thecostofproducingelectricity, asoutlinedinequation(3.14), includesthephysical
limitations of each generation unit. Whenever a unit is operating at its upper or lower
physical limit, the coinciding Lagrange multiplier is strictly positive. This cost of the
physical limitation is important for a central planner to take into consideration when
dispatching the electric grid as it limits the amount of electricity and electric reliability
available at each particular location in the network.
The transmission line constraints outlined in equation (3.15) would not be consid-
ered without a central planner. In particular, because the price of electricity at each bus,

i, is the same 8i only when 
l = 
l = 0; 8l. These Langrage multipliers are only all
equal to zero when none of the transmission lines are operating at their physical carrying
capacity limit. If the amount of electricity generated exceeded the line limits, a blackout
might ensue.
In total, these results demonstrate the importance of a “smart market” that gives dif-
ferent prices at dierent nodes, provided in real-time to all buyers and sellers of electric-
ity that reﬂect existing transmission constraints. Thus, the more ecient price signals
will optimally alleviate transmission line congestion, further reducing the overall cost
of providing a reliable electricity supply to consumers.
213.5 Global Pollutant and Electric Reliability
Now, both , the level of electric reliability provided for the entire electric system, and
, the air quality at all locations due to the global pollutant, are included in the model.
Appendix A.2 provides the detailed mathematical results that are summarized in this
section.
3.5.1 Social Planner
The social planner solves the following social welfare maximization problem:
max
xi;yi;;;
gi;ri;z
g
i ;zr
i;w
i ;i
W(u1(x1;y1;;);:::;uI(xI;yI;;)) (3.20)
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I X
j=1
z
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j  G (3.27)
P
min
i  gi + ri  P
max
i ; 8i (3.28)
I X
j=1
Cljj  jMlj; 8l (3.29)
1 = 0 (3.30)
22Objective function (3.20) is identical to objective function (3.3) except objective
function (3.20) now includes  as a variable in each consumer’s utility function.
Constraints (3.23) and (3.24) are new relative to the social planner’s optimization
problem from Section 3.3.1. Constraint (3.23) speciﬁes how much of the global pol-
lutant is created from each generator, given the output of electricity generated for con-
sumption, electricity generated for electric reliability, and the amount of the resource
dedicatedtoglobalpollutantemissionreductions. Constraint(3.24)speciﬁeshowglobal
pollutant emissions from each generator aggregate into a single air quality that all indi-
viduals consume. Constraints (3.27) and (3.8) are identical except that constraint (3.27)
now includes the use of the resource for reducing global pollutant emissions via w
i .
Constraints (3.21), (3.22), (3.25), (3.26), (3.28), (3.29), and (3.30) are identical to
constraints (3.4), (3.5), (3.6), (3.7), (3.9), (3.10), and (3.11), respectively.
The results of this maximization yield that the following equations must hold at
an optimal solution, where   is the Lagrange multiplier for the combination of con-
straints (3.23) and (3.24) as deﬁned by (3.1) and all other Lagrange multipliers are the
23same as in Section 3.3.1:
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3.5.2 Individual Consumer
Consider the individual consumer’s perspective of a competitive market. Each individ-
ual consumer at location i solves the following utility maximization problem:
max
xi;yi;;
ui(xi;yi;;) (3.34)
3 ixi + yi +   + i  mi (3.35)
Objective function (3.34) is consumer i’s utility function, which, compared to objec-
tive function (3.16), now includes . Constraint (3.35) is consumer i’s budget constraint,
which, compared to constraint (3.17), now includes the cost to improve the global pol-
lutant air quality.
In order for endogenous variables x
i, y
i, , and  to be optimal, the following ﬁrst
24order conditions must be satisﬁed:
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3.6 Criteria Pollutant and Electric Reliability
Instead of including a global pollutant as is done in Section 3.5, this section replaces
 with i, the air quality at each location due to the criteria pollutant. Appendix A.3
provides the detailed mathematical results that are summarized in this section.
253.6.1 Social Planner
The social planner solves the following social welfare maximization problem:
max
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Objective function (3.37) is identical to objective function (3.20) except objective
function (3.37) now includes i as a variable in each consumer’s utility function instead
of .
Constraints (3.40) and (3.41) are very similar to constraints (3.23) and (3.24). Con-
straint (3.40) speciﬁes the how much of the criteria pollutant is created for each gen-
erator, given the output of electricity generated for consumption, output of electricity
generated for electric reliability, and the amount of the resource dedicated to criteria
26pollutant emission reductions. Constraint (3.41) speciﬁes how criteria pollutant emis-
sions from each generator aggregate into an air quality for each location, which each
individual consumer in that location consumes. Constraint (3.44) is identical to con-
straint (3.27) except constraint (3.44) now includes the use of the resource for reducing
criteria pollutant emissions via w

i .
Constraints (3.38), (3.39), (3.42), (3.43), (3.45), (3.46), and (3.47) are identical to
constraints (3.4), (3.5), (3.6), (3.7), (3.9), (3.10), and (3.11), respectively.
The results of this maximization yield that the following equations must hold at
an optimal solution, where 
i are the I Lagrange multipliers for the combination of
constraints (3.40) and (3.41) as deﬁned by (3.2) and all other Lagrange multipliers are
the same as in Section 3.3.1:
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273.6.2 Individual Consumer
Consider the individual consumer’s perspective of a competitive market. Each individ-
ual consumer at location i solves the following utility maximization problem:
max
xi;yi;i;
ui(xi;yi;i;) (3.51)
3 ixi + yi + ii + i  mi (3.52)
Objective function (3.51) is consumer i’s utility function, which, compared to ob-
jective function (3.34), now includes i, the criteria pollutant, instead of , the global
pollutant. Constraint (3.52) is consumer i’s budget constraint, which, compared to con-
straint (3.35), now includes the cost to improve the criteria pollutant air quality rather
than the global air quality.
In order for endogenous variables x
i, y
i, 
i, and  to be optimal, the following ﬁrst
order conditions must be satisﬁed:
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3.7 Environmental Pollution and Electric Reliability Results
This section summarizes the new results beyond those presented in Section 3.4 from
the optimization problems that consider electric reliability with global and criteria air
pollutants, Sections 3.5 and 3.6, respectively.
283.7.1 Global Pollutant
Similar to the result for electric reliability in Section 3.4.2, equations (3.31) and (3.36)
are not the same. Equation (3.31), the result from the social planner’s maximization,
requires that in order to set the optimal level of global air quality that each consumer
receives, the sum of each consumer’s marginal rate of substitution between global air
quality and all other goods must be equated to the marginal cost of its ecient produc-
tion. On the other hand, equation (3.36), the result from an individual consumer’s utility
maximization, requires only that each individual’s marginal rate of substitution between
global air quality and all other goods must be equated to the marginal cost of its ecient
production.
Because a particular consumer’s marginal rate of substitution is generally less than
that of its sum over all consumers, too little global air quality will generally be provided
by a market mechanism without further government adjustment. Therefore, global air
quality is a public good and a competitive market will not yield the socially optimal
outcome.
3.7.2 Criteria Pollutant
Equations (3.48) and (3.53) are the same, making it look like the criteria pollutant is
a private good. This mathematical result is due to the model’s assumption of a single
representative consumer at each location. The use of a single consumer is a represen-
tative aggregation of many consumers at each node. If the model considered individual
consumers at each location, instead of one representative consumer, it would be clear
that the consumption of a single local air quality at each location would be a public good
from the perspective of the consumers at that each location. For example, suppose that
29in each of the I locations, there are N consumers, not one. All N consumers at location
i will consume a criteria pollutant air quality of i.
This is very similar to how all consumers at each of the I locations consume the
same air quality due to the global pollutant, . Hence, a similar result to the global
air pollutant will follow, such that the optimal provision of the public good from the
social planner’s perspective will take into the consideration the sum of each consumer’s
marginal rates of substitution. On the other hand, each individual consumer will only
consider his or her own marginal rate of substitution. Thus, criteria air pollution is not a
private good, rather a local public good at each location.
3.7.3 Electricity Generation
The optimal solution for each generation unit in the social planner’s problems consid-
ering global and criteria pollution have an important dierence. This dierence deter-
mines whether, given that a central planner sets transmission grid dependent variables,
proﬁt maximizing generation units are able to achieve the socially optimal solution in a
competitive market.
First, consider the social planner’s problem when considering a global pollutant.
Equation (3.32) outlines the optimal decision of how each generator should allocate the
single resource to the production of electricity for consumption and for electric relia-
bility. Equation (3.33) outlines the optimal choice for investment in global pollutant
emission reductions. Though both of these equations are complicated expressions that
rely on a central planner setting the optimal values for the public goods,  and , they
both are pair-wise matched for each generation unit. Therefore, if a central planner set
the optimal values for variables that are dependent on the electric grid, 
i and 
i, each
30individual generation unit would be able to achieve the socially optimal solution in a
competitive market when considering a global air pollutant.
Consider on the other hand equations (3.49) and (3.50) from the social planner’s
problem when considering a criteria pollutant. Both of these equations contain summa-
tions over the optimal decisions of all other generation units in the model. Therefore,
even if a central planner set the optimal values for variables that are dependent on the
electric grid, each individual generator would still need to compensate for the optimal
choices of all other generation units. These cross-terms make the socially optimal solu-
tion in a competitive market unlikely when considering a criteria air pollutant.
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AN ECONOMIC AND ENGINEERING NUMERICAL SIMULATION
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF CARBON DIOXIDE, SULFUR DIOXIDE,
AND NITROGEN OXIDE REGULATION ON EMISSIONS AND COSTS IN
THE ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR
4.1 Overview of Numerical Simulations
Numerical simulations of a highly simpliﬁed electricity network and airshed for North-
eastern North America are exercised under varying combinations of variables allowing
for meaningful research in two primary areas. The ﬁrst area is understanding the policy
impacts of environmental regulation, such as the RGGI, when faced with various con-
straints on the electric grid, such as a required reserve margin. The second area is to
study varying methodological practices for modeling the electric grid by comparing AC
and DC simulation results as well as examine line constraints.
4.2 Simulation Model Variables
Eleven dierent variables, each discussedin detailin thefollowing sections, are adjusted
to create each individual simulated scenario. Some of the variables are binary, while
others have multiple options. The variables considered in this modeling are:
1. AC or DC model (2 options),
2. transmission line constraints (2 options),
3. seasonal availability (2 options),
324. drought (2 options),
5. required reserve margin (2 options),
6. seasonal variation (16 options),
7. price of CO2 allowances (8 options),
8. price of SO2 allowances (4 options),
9. price of NOx allowances (4 options),
10. the applicability of emission costs by geographic location (2 options), and
11. the applicability of emission costs by generation unit size (2 options).
Variables 1. through 3. are used to study the various methodological practices for mod-
eling the electric grid, while variables 4. through 11. are used to understand the policy
impacts of environmental regulation. A total of 27 42 816 = 262;144 scenarios are
simulated.1
4.2.1 AC and DC modeling
A common simpliﬁed method of modeling a non-linear AC system is to model it as if it
were a linear DC system. General Electric’s MAPSTM and PowerWorld Corporation’s
Simulator
R  are two software packages that use this modeling technique. DC systems
remove voltage constraints and simplify stability constraints by imposing tighter ﬂow
constraints, known as “proxy limits,” on transmission lines. These linear simpliﬁcations
and proxy limits are designed to approximate the characteristics of the system under a
speciﬁc pattern of operation. The more a system departs from that pattern of operation,
the less accurate the results are by using these “proxy limits.”
1Because the cases of applying a $0/tonne CO2 emission cost to dierent geographically located and
sized generation units is redundant, there are only 245,760 unique scenarios.
33The reason to focus on this issue is that electric power systems are predominantly
AC. Furthermore, the characteristics of an electric power network can strongly inﬂu-
ence the eects of environmental policies that are applied to the power sector. The ﬂows
in such a network do not follow the shortest or most under-utilized route from where
power is generated to where it is consumed. Rather, electricity ﬂows follow laws of
physics known as Kircho’s Laws. The resulting constraints and ﬂow equations aect
which set of generation units satisﬁes electricity demand at the lowest cost in each mo-
ment. If emerging environmental regulations cause the electric system to operate under
conditions substantially dierent than at present, then these constraints and ﬂow equa-
tions also play a major role in determining the eects of a CO2 emission regulation on
emissions, cost, prices, proﬁts, fuel use, and leakage.
So, for example, more stringent emission regulations are likely to result in less use
of coal-burning generation units and more use of gas-burning generation units. Coal-
burning and gas-burning generation units have dierent geographic locations, so more
stringent environmental regulations may drastically alter the pattern of operation of the
power system. In addition to dispatch changes inside the regulated region, leakage
might occur across regulated and unregulated program boundaries. Leakage refers to
the increased emissions from generators outside of a regulated region as a result of the
increased marginal operating cost for generators inside a regulated region. This is of
particular concern because leakage could potentially partially, or completely, oset the
emission reductions from inside the regulated area with increased emissions from out-
side the regulated area.
Several studies of the economic and environmental eects of CO2 regulation have
been conducted to examine the issue of leakage. First, ICF International was hired
by the RGGI participating states to use their Integrated Planning Model
R  (IPM
R ) to
34examine the impacts of implementing the RGGI. The IPM
R  is a national model that
includes very detailed data on every generator in the United States as well as emission
rates for various pollutants, including CO2. However, it assumes that transmission is
unconstrained within regions (New York, for example, has ﬁve regions) and constrained
by aggregate ﬂow limits between adjacent regions [10]. Though easier to solve with this
simplifying assumption, the model does not even represent simpliﬁed DC ﬂows.
Similarly, the Haiku model employed by Resources for the Future uses constraints
between regions and it models generation using hundreds of characteristic “typical”
generators including typical emission characteristics, but does not incorporate widely
varying locational speciﬁc characteristics [16].
Though the two models dier in how they treat fuel prices, investment, retirement of
generators, etc., both studies suggest that leakage occurs but is not so great as to negate
the intended CO2 emission reductions by the RGGI [3].
Because every model is a simpliﬁcation of reality, this research sets out to determine
whether or not, and which, simpliﬁcations are acceptable. Detailed network modeling is
quite dicult and may not be important enough to justify the eort required. One of the
goals of this simulation is to test the hypothesis that it is important to model the network
with the added realism of AC constraints and ﬂow equations.
4.2.2 Transmission Line Constraints
In order to understand the importance of the transmission grid in the model (in com-
parison to IPM
R  and Haiku modeling), simulations are run both with and without the
enforcement of transmission line capacity constraints.
354.2.3 Seasonal Availability
A seasonal availability constraint on generators, which in reality is usually self-imposed
because of the costs of starting-up and shutting-down some types of large thermal units,
may be relevant for modeling purposes. In the basic optimal power ﬂow (OPF) problem
formulation, all generation units are assumed to be available to generate power between
each unit’s minimum and maximum generating capability, i.e. each generator must be
dispatched to generate at least its minimum generating capacity in the optimal solution.
This minimum generation imposition for each generator is unrealistic because the actual
dispatch of the electric grid never requires all generators to produce simultaneously at
or above their minimum. Rather, generators bid into an auction the price at which they
are willing to generate electricity and the dispatcher chooses the generators that will
meet demand at the lowest cost to operate the electric grid. Therefore, this constraint
is relaxed in the seasonal availability constrained dispatch scenarios by shutting down
eligible units for an entire season.
Because gas- and oil-ﬁred generation units have very short startup times, they are
assumed to have a generating capacity ranging from zero at its minimum to the speciﬁc
unit’s maximum generating capability. Therefore, gas- and oil-ﬁred generation units are
not considered in the seasonal availability algorithm.
On the other hand, coal-ﬁred generation units have a very long startup time and are
therefore the only generators considered for shut down via the seasonal availability al-
gorithm.2 The candidate list for shutdown is built by ranking each coal-ﬁred generation
unit by its time-weighted mean proﬁts over the entire season. The coal-ﬁred generation
unit with the least proﬁts over the entire season is shutdown sequentially and each subse-
2Nuclear-poweredgenerationunitsalsohaveaverylongstartuptime, butbecausetheyhaveamarginal
cost of electricity generation close to zero, they are not considered in the seasonal availability algorithm.
36quent seasonal scenario is run with that generator unavailable. The process of removing
the least proﬁtable coal-ﬁred generation unit continues until either the time-weighted
mean objective function (i.e. the total cost of operating the electric system) increases, at
least one of the seasonal scenarios results in an infeasible solution, or the candidate list
is exhausted.
4.2.4 Drought
One type of event that could cause a change in generator availability expectations is a
drought, which reduces the amount of hydropower available for dispatch. Hydropower
is one of the two largest sources of electricity generation that produces virtually zero air
emissions (the other being nuclear) and a drought could cause a signiﬁcant shift in the
optimal dispatching and emissions in a situation with high emissions prices.
A drought scenario is modeled by reducing hydropower capacity to be 80 percent
of its maximum generating capacity under normal conditions. This percentage is cho-
sen based on the past 40 years of data (ending in 1999) that recorded four “severe” or
“extreme” droughts in the Northeastern United States. Each drought lasted between one
to ﬁve years, resulting in a reduction of rainfall of at least approximately 20 percent of
normal (the largest was a 50 percent reduction from normal from 1984–1985) [12].
4.2.5 Operating Reserve Margin
In the true dispatch of the electric grid, a reserve margin of available generation in
excess of actual demand is mandated to ensure electric reliability. The operating reserve
margin is calculated by considering the loss of the largest generator operating on the
37system, which translates to about two to three percent, depending on the system. When
a reserve margin is enforced in a scenario, each RTO maintains its own reserve margin,
which is set to be three percent of the summer peak load for all seasonal scenarios.
4.2.6 Seasonal Variation
Electric Demand
The electric demand modeled in the simulations is based on 16 typical hour types that
represent one calendar year. For each of the four seasons: fall (October–November),
winter (December–February), spring (March–April), and summer (May–September),
the total electric demand is further split into four bins: peak, high, medium, and low.
In each season, the hours of 2007 total system demand (i.e. the sum all RTO’s de-
mand) is ranked. The top ﬁve percent of the hours are the peak bin, the next 25 percent
of the hours is the high bin, the next 40 percent of the hours is the medium bin, and
the low bin is the lowest 30 percent of the hours. To create a single value for each bin
in each RTO, the demand in each RTO is the mean of the demand in that RTO in the
corresponding time bin. The number of hours per year that each of these 16 dierent
demand levels occur is outlined in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 also presents the amount of electricity demanded in each region and hour
type, as a proportion of the summer peak electric demand as provided in Allen, Lang,
and Ili´ c [1].3 Demand for electricity is highest during the hour that represents the
highest-load hours of the summer and is lowest during the hour that represents the
lowest-load hours of the fall. Electric demand is assumed to be perfectly inelastic be-
3The Allen, Lang, and Ili´ c model does not have any electricity demanded in the Quebec RTO, so its
proportion is set to zero.
38cause few electricity consumers currently face real-time electricity prices. Each hour
type uses the average electric demand in each region during the corresponding hours
based on 2007 hourly loads in each ISO.
Table 4.1: Electric demand as a ratio of summer peak electric demand
Demand type Hours/
Year
PJM NYISO ISO-NE IESO Quebec Maritimes
F
a
l
l
Peak 73 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.74 0.00 0.90
High 366 0.59 0.63 0.64 0.70 0.00 0.90
Medium 586 0.52 0.56 0.57 0.64 0.00 0.86
Low 439 0.42 0.45 0.43 0.53 0.00 0.74
W
i
n
t
e
r Peak 108 0.72 0.73 0.76 0.85 0.00 1.15
High 540 0.65 0.68 0.70 0.79 0.00 1.08
Medium 864 0.58 0.61 0.62 0.71 0.00 1.01
Low 648 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.60 0.00 0.91
S
p
r
i
n
g Peak 73 0.67 0.67 0.72 0.80 0.00 1.09
High 366 0.57 0.62 0.63 0.72 0.00 0.97
Medium 585 0.52 0.56 0.57 0.65 0.00 0.91
Low 439 0.43 0.46 0.45 0.55 0.00 0.84
S
u
m
m
e
r Peak 184 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.00 0.87
High 918 0.72 0.75 0.72 0.75 0.00 0.84
Medium 1469 0.57 0.62 0.59 0.65 0.00 0.79
Low 1102 0.44 0.48 0.45 0.53 0.00 0.69
Availability of Generation Units
Generation units are sometimes not available for operation because of maintenance or
repair. Rather than simulate discrete outages, maximum and minimum real power ca-
pability of each generation unit is scaled using an average availability rate. Availability
is highest in the summer and winter seasons because that is the most proﬁtable time of
year to produce electricity. The spring and fall are relatively low demand seasons with
low prices making them the best time to do maintenance.
For fossil fuel generation units, this availability adjustment is made by ﬁrst multiply-
39ing the real and reactive power generation capacity4 of all fossil fueled units by 0.9613,
which is the proportion of the time they were not having unplanned outages in 2006
according to the NERC [14]. That result is then multiplied by an availability modiﬁer
speciﬁc to the hour type, as shown in Table 4.2. The fossil fuel adjustment factors dier
from one in proportion to the amount by which the load during the respective hour type
deviates from the load during the summer peak hour type.
Table 4.2: Generator capability scaling as a ratio of summer peak availability
Demand type Hours/
Year
Coal Oil Gas Hydro Nuclear Wind Refuse
F
a
l
l
Peak 73 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.97 0.73 1.00 1.00
High 366 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.96 0.73 1.00 1.00
Medium 586 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.95 0.73 1.00 1.00
Low 439 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.93 0.73 1.00 1.00
W
i
n
t
e
r Peak 108 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.84 1.00 1.00
High 540 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.97 0.84 1.00 1.00
Medium 864 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.96 0.84 1.00 1.00
Low 648 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.94 0.84 1.00 1.00
S
p
r
i
n
g Peak 73 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.98 0.75 1.00 1.00
High 366 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.96 0.75 1.00 1.00
Medium 585 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.95 0.75 1.00 1.00
Low 439 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.93 0.75 1.00 1.00
S
u
m
m
e
r Peak 184 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
High 918 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00
Medium 1469 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00
Low 1102 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00
The economics of using non-fossil fuel generation units (those relying on hydro,
nuclear, wind, or refuse) are dierent from the economics of dispatching fossil fuel gen-
eration units. For nuclear, refuse, wood, and run-of-river hydropower generation units,
the marginal cost of operation is typically close to zero. The non-fossil fuel generation
4The quantity of real power, usually in units of megawatts, a generation unit is capable of producing is
commonly referred to as that generator’s capacity. In fact though, all generation units have both real and
reactive generation limits. The generation unit’s “capability curve” plots the tradeo between the unit’s
ability to generate real and reactive power.
40units are modeled as having a marginal cost of zero,5 but their maximum capacities are
adjusted according to the hour type, as shown in Table 4.2.
For the nuclear units, these maximum capacity adjustments represent outages for
refueling and other maintenance, which are most commonly scheduled in the fall and
spring. For the hydro units, these adjustments represent the output decisions that result
from water availability, environmental constraints on river ﬂow, and intertemporal opti-
mization of the use of available water. For wind and refuse, each of which constitutes
only a miniscule proportion of total generation capacity, it is assumed that output does
not vary by hour type, as shown in Table 4.2.
Allen, Lang, and Ili´ c report the approximate output from each non-fossil generator
type at each bus in Northeast North America during the summer peak hour that they
model, ignoring types that provide less than a few percent of the output at the bus. This
output is taken as the maximum output in any hour type from that generation type at that
bus, since the summer peak hour is the hour with greatest total demand.6
For hydro, the adjustment to hourly demand in Table 4.2 makes the total capacity
factor (output divided by capacity) for the year equal to that reported by NERC in [14].
The hydro adjustment factors deviate from one in proportion to the amount by which
load during the respective hour type deviates from load during the summer peak hour
type.
For nuclear, the adjustment to hourly demand in Table 4.2 makes the total capacity
5A result of having a marginal cost of zero is that the unit generates at its maximum available capacity
all, or almost all, of the time.
6For the hydro units taken together, this output is approximately 63 percent of the output that the
units can produce when they all have an abundance of water. Sometimes, they do produce more than this
amount of power, but much of the variation in water availability does not correlate with this model’s hour
types. Average hydropower output per month is close to being constant. Even in the spring, when snow is
melting, Northeastern North America hydropower output is only about ﬁve percent higher than output in
other seasons. This model does not represent this seasonal dierence, but its eect on the results would
be small.
41factorfortheyearequaltotheweightedequivalentavailabilityfactor7 of0.8899reported
by NERC in [14]. The nuclear adjustment factors are the same for all hour types of a
season because nuclear generators generally have constant output when they operate.
The nuclear adjustment factors deviate from one in proportion to the amount by which
load during the respective hour type deviates from load during the summer peak hour
type.
4.2.7 Emissions Prices
Various CO2, SO2, and NOx prices are considered in the simulations. These prices are
chosen in order to cover a wide range of pricing (i.e. policy) scenarios — from very low
to very high — to simulate both where prices have been recently and where they could
go in the future. Furthermore, the wide range of prices considered allows the plotting of
smoother curves when analyzing the impacts of price changes for each pollutant.
Table 4.3 outlines the eight prices used for CO2. In particular, a CO2 price of $3.51
is used because that is the auction clearing price from the March 2009 RGGI auction
for 2009 allocation year CO2 allowances.8 The highest price chosen, $250 per metric
tonne, is selected because at that price the dispatch of generators will certainly change
and because it is an extremely high price relative to current experience, but is a level that
might be reached in the future.
Table 4.3: Emission prices for CO2 ($/metric tonne)
CO2 0 3.51 10 25 50 100 175 250
7Roughly speaking, an “availability factor” indicates the proportion of the time a unit is not out of
operation for maintenance or repair.
8At the time of running the simulations, this was the most recent RGGI auction price.
42Table 4.4 outlines the four prices used for each of SO2 and NOx. A non-zero price
of SO2 and NOx is required because environmental standards are already in place for
these pollutants, while this is not the case for CO2. Furthermore, the emission rates of
the generation units assume a non-zero price of SO2 and NOx.
Table 4.4: Emission prices for SO2 and NOx ($/metric tonne)
SO2 200 700 1,200 1,700
NOx 500 2,000 3,500 5,000
4.2.8 Applicability of Emission Costs
By Geographic Location
One of the main worries for all regional environmental programs is leakage. As gen-
erators inside the regulated area are forced to pay for CO2 permits, the prices at which
they can oer to proﬁtably sell power rises compared to the prices at which generators
outside of the regulated region can oer to proﬁtably sell power. This may cause emis-
sions outside of the regulated area to increase, partially (if not completely) osetting the
emission reductions in the regulated area, as cheaper, more polluting, power is imported
from the non-regulated area to the regulated area.
Therefore, in an eort to understand the impacts of leakage, CO2 emission costs are
applied in two dierent ways in the simulation model:
1. to all generation units both in the United States and Canada, and
2. only to RGGI area generation units.
43In both of these cases, SO2 and NOx emission costs are applied to every generation unit
in the simulation model.9
The geographic representation of the RGGI is approximate. One of the buses in
the Allen, Lang, and Ili´ c model is enormous, and includes parts of states participating
in the RGGI as well as parts of states not participating in the RGGI. The RGGI states
included in this bus are all of Delaware and parts of New Jersey and Maryland. This bus
is counted as being entirely outside of the RGGI area in order to maintain transmission
constraints between RGGI and non-RGGI parts of the system.
By Generation Unit Size
As currently implemented, the RGGI exempts generation units with a nameplate capac-
ity of less than 25 megawatts (MW). Therefore, simulations are run both enforcing and
not enforcing this size limitation to evaluate the impact of such exemptions of relatively
small generation units.
4.3 Simulation Data
These numerical simulations use the 2007 electric power system because complete data
are readily available, allowing a representation of what is essentially the current system
to be constructed. Investment in new generation and transmission capacity is a slow pro-
cess, so it is worthwhile to examine what the existing possibilities are for CO2 reduction
in response to an emission tax or cap and trade program.
9Canada has its own SO2 and NOx regulations, though it works closely with the United States because
about half of the acid rain in eastern Canada comes from the United States. For simplicity, it is assumed
that all generators, both in the United States and Canada, face the same SO2 and NOx prices [7].
44The underlying data used in these simulations are compiled from multiple sources
and in some case are adjusted as described in the following sections.
4.3.1 Buses and Transmission Lines
The buses and transmission lines of the physical network used in these simulations are
shown in Figure 4.1 [1]. The network includes buses and transmission lines from New
York, New England, New Jersey, Delaware, Washington, D.C., and parts of Pennsyl-
vania, Maryland, Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritime Provinces. Allen, Lang, and Ili´ c
developed this network representation as a simpliﬁed version of the Northeastern North
America power grid, which has thousands of buses and transmission lines. Their sim-
pliﬁed representation aggregates the Northeastern North America grid into 36 buses and
121 transmission lines.
The simpliﬁed network approximates thermal, voltage, and reactive power con-
straints of the real system and “...some of the major intra- and inter-area congestion
patterns are preserved...” [1]. Consequently, using a simpliﬁed representation of the
AC network, with dozens instead of thousands of buses and transmission lines, is neces-
sary because it allows the operation of the system to be solved. Given that no completed
study of CO2 regulation includes an AC network, it is at least reasonable to examine the
issues raised by CO2 regulation using an available, if simpliﬁed, AC network model.
Furthermore, the optimization problem associated with determining the operation
of an AC network has more constraints, is non-linear, and is complex compared to DC
system. It is this tradeo between the complexity of an AC model to the speed of
calculationofaDCmodelthatwillbeexploredintermsofitseectonemissionpatterns
and system operating cost.
45Figure 1: One-line diagram of the equivalenced 36-bus model. Note that: “PAR” indicates that the corresponding
line contains a phase angle regulator; “Limited” indicates that the corresponding line has a power ﬂow limit; “(2)”
and “(3)” indicate that the corresponding line is a double and triple line, respectively; and the line color indicates
line ownership as listed in the color key.
Section 3, were applied to the remaining areas to greatly
reduce the number of buses in the model. The buses in
the reduced model were individually selected to provide
a good representation of the Northeastern US bulk elec-
tric power system, particularly in New York and (to a
lesser extent) New England, while limiting the size of the
model to 40 buses or less. Correspondingly, New York
is represented by 19 buses, New England is represented
by 8 buses, Ontario is represented by 5 buses, Pennsyl-
vania - New Jersey - Maryland (PJM) is represented by
2 buses, and Quebec and the Maritimes Region are each
represented by a single bus radially connected to New
York and New England, respectively. Thus, the reduced
electrical model has a total of 36 buses.
Each bus in the 36-bus model contains both load and
generation which represent the aggregate load and gener-
ation in the vicinity of the bus. The single bus at 9M PT
2G (77950) was used as the swing bus during network
reduction because it o ered the best numerical conver-
gence during the process. It is therefore listed as the
swing bus in the model. However, a more remote bus
with larger generation, such as Alburtis (1), is probably
a more appropriate choice for subsequent studies. The
remaining buses are modeled as PV buses having con-
stant real power injection and constant voltage as long as
the equivalent generator at the bus has su cient reactive
power capability; that is, as long as the generator can
operate within its VAR limits. However, if the reactive
power required from the generator to support the voltage
set-point exceeds the VAR limits of the generator, then
the bus becomes a PQ bus having constant real and re-
active power injections, with the reactive power output
of the generator equal to its limit. In this case, the bus
voltage varies. In general, all bus voltages should be kept
within 0.95 per-unit and 1.05 per-unit, except for Ontario
which is allowed an upper voltage limit of 1.1 per-unit.
A one-line diagram of the 36-bus model is given in
Figure 1. The electrical model itself is given in the Ap-
pendix in PTI-23 format [4]. PTI-23 format o ers two
data ﬁelds with which to compartmentalize the model:
areas and zones. Here, the area ﬁeld is used to identify
market zones so as to facilitate the incorporation of his-
torical market data. The zone ﬁeld is used to identify
market subzones.
Figure 4.1: Physical network used in the simulation model
4.3.2 Generation Units
The generator data at each bus are a combination of data from Energy Visuals, Inc.,
Allen, Lang, and Ili´ c, and the EPA [20]. The data on generation units purchased from
Energy Visuals, Inc. came from the 2006 reliability planning process of the Multire-
gional Modeling Working Group, the group responsible for examining the adequacy of
the electric power system in the Eastern United States and Canada under the auspices
of the NERC. The data consists of the generator units projected to be operational in the
summer of 2008. There are approximately 2,000 such units in the region modeled. For
each unit, its name, minimum and maximum real and reactive generating capability, fuel
type, fuel use per megawatt-hour (MWh) of output, fuel price in 2007, longitude, and
latitude is known.
46Real Power Capacity
The total amount of fossil-fueled real power capacity of each generator is calculated us-
ing data from Allen, Lang, and Ili´ c. At each of their 36 buses, they report total real and
reactive generation capacity (in the second-to-last, ﬁfth, and sixth columns of the gen-
eration block of their appendix), total real and reactive generation in the summer peak
load hour(in the thirdand fourth columnsof thegeneration block oftheir appendix), and
approximate percentage of that real-power generation coming from each fuel type (coal,
gas, oil, nuclear, hydro, refuse, and wind). At buses with more than zero percent of
their real power generation from fossil fuels (coal, gas, and oil), fossil-fueled real power
capacity is calculated as the total real power generation capacity minus generation from
non-fossil sources.10
Reactive Power Capacity
The total amount of reactive power capacity at each bus, which is important for voltage
stability, is calculated by combining two parts. The ﬁrst part is a constant reactive power
injection that represents the amount of reactive power that the transmission system pro-
duces or absorbs at each bus. In this reduced model, many of these constant injections
are negative and have large magnitudes, as a result of the model reduction.
The second part of the reactive power capacity is the reactive power capabilities of
the generation units. Each generator has a range of reactive outputs it can produce, with
a maximum that is typically positive and a minimum that is typically negative. The
capabilities of the fossil-fueled generators are scaled so that the total maximum and
10This produces estimated fossil-fueled generation capacity of 93,772 MW. If instead fossil-fueled
real-power capacity is calculated as total real-power generation capacity multiplied by the percent of
generation coming from fossil fuels, the total is 92,515 MW.
47minimum reactive capacity at each bus, including the ﬁxed injection and the reactive
capabilities at the non-fossil-fueled units, is ten percent farther from the ﬁxed reactive
power injection than the reactive power capacity totals in Allen, Lang, and Ili´ c. The
total reactive power ranges are made wider than in Allen, Lang, and Ili´ c’s model in
order to represent relatively inexpensive opportunities for providing reactive power by
other means that are not otherwise represented in this model, such as the installation of
capacitors and inductors.
It is assumed that a generation unit can provide reactive power up to its maximum
limit or down to its minimum limit without cost if that unit is running. The only genera-
tionunitsturnedointheoptimizationarecoal-ﬁredgenerators, aspartoftheirseasonal
availability economic calculation. Therefore, a need for reactive power can contribute to
keeping a coal-ﬁred generation unit turned on and available within a particular season.
Emission Rates
From the fuel type, fuel use per MWh, and carbon content of dierent fuel types [6] the
CO2 emission rate per MWh of each generation unit can be calculated. SO2 and NOx
emissions are calculated using EPA reports of SO2 and NOx emissions and generation
output. These reports contain information for most fossil-fueled generation units with
capacities over 25 MW. The units in the EPA data are matched with units in the Energy
Visuals, Inc. data based on name or owner name, fuel, and generation capacity. Latitude
and longitude are used to verify the match. For units not included in the EPA data,
the emissions rates in Table 4.5, which are the average emissions rates of the units that
appear in both the EPA and Energy Visuals, Inc. data, are assigned.
48Table 4.5: Assumed emission rates when unknown (tonne/MWh)
Fuel SO2 rate NOx rate
Coal 0.006202 0.000824
Diesel Oil 0.000133 0.000927
Pipeline Natural Gas 0 0.000136
Residual Oil 0.000632 0.000504
Assignment of Generation Units to Buses
The assignment of some of the generation units by Allen, Lang, and Ili´ c to each of their
36 buses is known. The other generation units are assigned by geographic proximity
and then scaled by their real power capabilities separately at each bus so that the real
power capacity total at each bus matched the total from Allen, Lang, and Ili´ c.
4.4 Optimization Formulation Representing Generator Dispatch
The electricity system simulation software11 is written in the MATLAB
R  programming
language12 utilizing the MATPOWER software package,13 a full AC and DC optimiza-
tion framework developed at Cornell University, to solve the OPF problem. Like a RTO,
MATPOWER solves the OPF problem by minimizing the cost of operating the electric
power system subject to the demands and availability of electricity at each node, the
transmission capability of each line in the system, and the voltage and stability require-
ments.
The standard formulation of MATPOWER’s AC OPF problem solves for the en-
dogenous variable x, for vectors of voltage angles , voltage magnitudes Vm, real power
11See Appendix B for technical computation information and source code.
12See http://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab/ for more information.
13See http://www.pserc.cornell.edu/matpower/ for more information.
49injections Pg, and reactive power injections Qg [28].14
x =
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4

Vm
Pg
Qg
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
(4.1)
The standard MATPOWER formulation can be extended to include user-deﬁned
costs fu and endogenous variables z. For the purposes of these simulations, additional
costs are imposed in the objective function to include the cost of the pollutants in the
model, CO2, SO2, and NOx.
Therefore, thegeneralizedformulationoftheOPFproblemtakesthefollowingform.
min
x;z f(x) + fu(x;z)
3 g(x) = 0 (4.2)
h(x)  0 (4.3)
xmin  x  xmax
l  A
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
x
z
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
 u
zmin  z  zmax (4.4)
Using the theoretical model in Chapter 3 as an example, x in equation (4.1) would
be deﬁned as the combined vector of xi and i. A user deﬁned endogenous variable
z would include zi (in addition to other variables). Constraint (3.6) is an example of
constraint (4.2). An example of an inequality constraint outlined in constraint (4.3)
is constraint (3.8). Finally, constraint (3.9) provides and example of upper and lower
bounded constraints on a variable, as described in constraint (4.4).
14The DC OPF problem only solves for  and Pg, not Vm or Qg.
50It is assumed that in solving the OPF that the generators exist in a competitive mar-
ket. The numerical simulations (and the theoretical model) do not attempt to analyze
the potential for or impacts of exercising market power either in the electricity markets,
cap and trade auctions for environmental allowances, or interactions between the two.
Therefore, each generator is assumed to oer its entire range of real generation capacity
at its (constant in these simulations) marginal cost.
4.5 Simulation Results
The results of the numerical simulations can be broken down into two categories. The
ﬁrstcategoryexaminesenvironmentalpolicywhilethesecondexaminesmethodological
questions.
4.5.1 Policy Implications
This section looks at the policy implications of the RGGI predicted by the numerical
simulations.
Leakage
Leakage is a concern in any regional program and the numerical simulations predict that
leakage is an important problem facing the RGGI.
Figure 4.2 depicts the total CO2 emissions, CO2 emissions inside the RGGI area,
and CO2 emissions outside the RGGI area. At a RGGI price of $3.51 per tonne, the
510 50 100 150 200 250
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
x 10
8
Price of CO
2 emissions ($/tonne)
C
O
2
 
e
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
(
t
o
n
n
e
)
 
 
Total
Inside RGGI
Outside RGGI
Figure 4.2: Leakage in the RGGI
model15 predicts a reduction of about 1.15 million tonnes of CO2 inside the RGGI area
and an increase of 1.06 million tonnes outside the RGGI area, for a net reduction of
90,000 thousand tonnes of CO2. Even at a very high CO2 price of $250/tonne, the 45
percent reduction of CO2 emissions inside the RGGI area only garner a net reduction of
three percent total emissions in the entire model.
Comparing the net impacts of applying CO2 costs to only some of the generators
in the model, as is the case in the RGGI, with the case of applying CO2 costs to all
generators in the model, the clear dierence is shown in Figure 4.3. With a very high
CO2 price of $250 tonne, the net CO2 reduction from the RGGI is only a few percent.
15Seasonal availability, AC, emission costs to all generators greater than 25 MW in size, no drought,
no reserve margin, SO2 =$700/tonne, and NOx =2,000/tonne.
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Figure 4.3: CO2 emissions in the RGGI and with all generators facing CO2 costs
On the other hand, when CO2 costs are applied to all generators, an almost 20 percent
reduction in CO2 emissions occurs at a price of $250 per tonne.
Thus, the creation of a small regional CO2 program, such as the RGGI, can have a
limited net impact compared to a program that encompasses a much larger area. While
gross emissions in the regulated area will decrease, the increased importation of rela-
tively cheap, high-emitting generation from outside the program boundary can oset
the reductions created by the regional program.
53Cost to Consumers
Thelocational-basedmarginalprice(LMP)ateachbusprovidesanindicationofhowthe
RGGI will impact electricity prices for consumers. Figure 4.4 shows how various CO2
prices change the time- and load-weighted mean LMP at each bus per year,16 separated
by buses inside and outside the RGGI area.
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Figure 4.4: The LMP at each bus, both inside and outside the RGGI
At low CO2 prices, for example the last RGGI auction price of $3.51 per tonne, the
impact on LMP both inside and outside the RGGI area is quite small. Then, as expected,
16Seasonal availability, AC, emission costs to all generators greater than 25 MW in size, no drought,
no reserve margin, SO2 =$700/tonne, and NOx =2,000/tonne.
54the LMP at buses inside the RGGI area are more drastically impacted by the imposition
of increasingly higher CO2 prices.
Of note inside the RGGI area are buses 76663 and 79584 which are located in north-
westernNewYorkState. Bothofthesebusesareprimarilyservicedbylargehydropower
facilities (Niagara Falls). At a CO2 price of $250 per tonne, consumers at these buses
are paying electricity prices similar to those paid by others in the RGGI area when the
CO2 price was only $100 per tonne. This occurs because the large amount of non-CO2
emitting hydropower servicing these consumers does not have to pay for costly CO2 al-
lowances. Nevertheless, the LMP at these buses is not constant because the hydropower
generators cannot completely fulﬁll the demand for electricity at these buses and higher
cost sources of electricity that use CO2 allowances must be used.
A more aggregated analysis of the cost to consumers is presented in Table 4.6. This
table shows, for all CO2 prices, how the mean LMP both inside and outside the RGGI
area changes when CO2 costs are applied to all generators and those inside the RGGI
area only.17 From every consumer’s perspective, it is cheaper to have the CO2 costs
applied only to the RGGI area generators, not applied to all generators in the system.
This is especially true for the consumers living outside the RGGI area. The reason for
this result is that when CO2 costs are only applied to the RGGI area generators, there
is an ability to import cheap power from the non-RGGI area, keeping RGGI area prices
lower than if this opportunity was not there. But, when the CO2 costs are applied to
all generators, this opportunity disappears and all generators in the system face higher
marginal costs of production, so all consumers face higher prices. Note that the exporta-
tion of cheap electricity from the non-RGGI area to the RGGI area does come at a price
to consumers in the non-RGGI area. The price of electricity outside the RGGI area does
17Seasonal availability, AC, line constraints, no drought, no operating reserve margin, SO2
=$700/tonne, and NOx =2,000/tonne.
55not stay constant. The increased supply of electricity from the non-RGGI area causes its
price to increase even though no environmental regulation is imposed on its generators.
Table 4.6: Time- and load-weighted mean LMP ($/MWh)
CO2 price Inside the RGGI Outside the RGGI
($/MWh) all RGGI all RGGI
0 70.95 70.95 63.50 63.50
3.51 73.39 72.64 66.19 64.12
10 77.80 76.20 71.08 65.13
25 87.81 84.01 81.76 67.02
50 104.11 97.77 99.45 70.02
100 139.67 124.93 136.47 73.54
175 191.76 162.07 193.68 75.28
250 244.20 199.03 251.67 76.74
Thus, regardless of whether the CO2 price is imposed on all generators or only
on those in a particular region, the price of electricity will increase for all consumers.
Though all consumers will face an increase in their electricity rates, the magnitude of the
change is dependent on which generators the CO2 costs are applied. In the case that CO2
costs are applied to all generators, the increase in electricity rates is roughly identical for
all consumers. If CO2 costs are applied to only generators in a small, regulated region,
those consumers living inside the regulated area will face approximately the same rate
increases as when the costs are applied to all generators, while consumers outside the
regulated area will face only modest increases in their electricity rates.
Industry Proﬁt and Fuel Composition
Goulder [8] predicted that a CO2 tax of $25 would reduce proﬁts of the electric power
industry by 7.4 percent in 2002. In contrast, Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn [2] predicted
that the RGGI would increase proﬁts for generators by $0.9 billion in 2025. In Burtraw,
56Palmer, and Kahn’s model, the eects are concentrated in the Northeast United States,
while Goulder models the nationwide eects of a national American policy. In addition,
Goulder uses a general equilibrium model that allows for the installation and removal of
industrial plants and equipment. Either of these dierences might possibly explain the
dierence in the signs of their estimated industry proﬁt impacts.
Figure 4.5 shows this model’s predictions of the eects on the short-run, aggregate
proﬁts of the modeled generators when CO2 emission prices are imposed both on all
generators and only RGGI area generators. Note that the added proﬁts are the greatest
for the least polluting generators, which can lead to a very dierent result in the long-
run. In particular, as less polluting generators are built, LMPs and therefore proﬁts
will be reduced in the long-run. Nevertheless, the short-run distortion in proﬁts is an
argument in favor of having the government capture the CO2 allowance fees rather than
the generation units.
It is assumed that the generators must pay for all emissions at the speciﬁed emission
price, and the short-run proﬁts shown are net of these payments. These numerical sim-
ulations predict that industry proﬁts increase with the implementation of the RGGI, and
this eect increases with the stringency of the policy. This result suggests that, at least
in Northeastern North America, the industry as a whole will gain proﬁt as a result of
the RGGI regulations, without receiving any emission permits for free or any rebate of
emission taxes.
Of course, not all generation units are the same. Though total industry proﬁts will
increase, the proﬁts of generators using dierent fuel types will vary. Figure 4.6 shows
the proﬁts of fossil-ﬁred generation units18 with dierent levels of CO2 prices. Each bar
stacks the proﬁts of coal, oil, and natural gas-ﬁred generation units. For each CO2 price,
18The proﬁts of non-fossil-ﬁred generation units are not shown because their proﬁts will always be
strictly increasing with CO2 price.
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Figure 4.5: Total industry proﬁts
the bar on the left denotes the proﬁts when a CO2 price is imposed on all generators in
the model, while the bar on the right only imposes a CO2 price on the generators inside
the RGGI area.
When the CO2 prices are imposed on only generators inside the RGGI area, coal
proﬁts from outside the RGGI area continue to increase. In this case, the gain in proﬁts
earned outside the RGGI area oset the dramatic decrease in proﬁts from inside the
RGGI area, thus providing a net an increase in total proﬁts for coal-ﬁred generation as a
group.
On the other hand, when CO2 prices are imposed on all generators in the model, the
proﬁts of all coal-ﬁred generation fall while natural gas proﬁts increase. Only at about
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Figure 4.6: Fossil-ﬁred generation proﬁts
$100/tonne of CO2 does the loss in proﬁt for coal-ﬁred generation become oset by the
increase in natural gas-ﬁred generation proﬁt. Hence, the proﬁts fall at ﬁrst, and then
begin to rise once the CO2 price is large enough.
Figure 4.7 demonstrates that the amount of generation by existing fossil-ﬁred gen-
eration follows a similar direction as these same units’ proﬁts. When CO2 costs are ap-
plied to generators in the RGGI area only, imports of electricity from outside the RGGI
area increase while the number of MWh generated inside the RGGI area decrease. The
imported generation is serviced by increased generation of both natural gas- and coal-
ﬁred generation. On the other hand, when CO2 costs are applied to all generators in
the model, coal-ﬁred generation decreases everywhere and natural gas-ﬁred generation
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Figure 4.7: Fossil-ﬁred generation
increases.
Thus, the long-run incentive for building new generation facilities depends on the
expected CO2 regulation. If the expectation is that a uniform policy will be applied to
all generators, then non-emitting generation types, such as nuclear and wind, have a
clear incentive to be built. On the other hand, if CO2 policy will remain fragmented
to speciﬁc regions, coal- and oil-ﬁred generation are still proﬁtable as long as they are
constructed outside the regulated region(s).
60Emission Price Volatility — Drought
A cap and trade program is susceptible to price volatility in response to changes in
expected allowance supply or demand. One type of event that could cause such a change
is a drought, which reduces the amount of hydropower, one of the two largest power
types that are associated with virtually zero CO2 emissions.
Figure 4.8 shows the eect of a drought that reduces hydropower production by 20
percent.19 In the later years of the RGGI, annual emission reductions of two and a half
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Figure 4.8: The impact of a drought on annual CO2 emissions
percent are scheduled. Without a drought, this annual reduction could be achieved with
19Seasonal availability, AC, emission costs to all generators greater than 25 MW in size, no operating
reserve margin, SO2 =$700/tonne, and NOx =2,000/tonne.
61a CO2 price less than $10 per tonne. In the case of a drought though, a CO2 price of
almost $30 would be needed to achieve that same two and a half percent reduction.
Thus, an unexpected change in allowance supply or demand can cause a dramatic
increase in the price of CO2 allowances needed to meet a targeted emission reduction.
Operating Reserve Margin
An operating reserve margin is implemented in a RTO in order to maintain a speciﬁed
level of electric reliability. Table 4.7 shows the percentage change in total system cost
and CO2 emissions between not implementing an operating reserve margin and imple-
menting an operating reserve margin of three percent in each RTO.
Table 4.7: Percent change of system cost and CO2 emissions from a system without, to
a system with, an operating reserve
System cost CO2 emissions
CO2 price all CO2 cost RGGI CO2 cost all CO2 cost RGGI CO2 cost
$0 0.01% 0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
$3.51 0.01% 0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
$10 0.01% 0.01% -0.01% 0.01%
$25 0.01% 0.02% -0.01% -0.01%
$50 0.01% 0.04% 0.01% 0.01%
$100 0.01% 0.17% 0.01% 0.11%
$175 0.02% 0.43% 0.12% 0.20%
$250 0.12% 0.42% 0.43% -0.01%
Thus, it is clear from these results that the modeled operating reserve margin has
almost no impact on the dispatch of the system. Regardless of whether the CO2 cost
is applied to all generators, or just generators in the RGGI area, the results described
in Table 4.7 yield a less than a half a percent change in either the system operating
cost or CO2 emissions. This result could be because of the coarse nature of the model.
62With a ﬁner grain, locational reliability might be impacted by the imposition of a CO2
allowance price.
SO2 and NOx Emissions
Figure 4.9 shows the demand curves for SO2 and NOx emission permits at CO2 prices of
$0 and $100. The emission rates for SO2 and NOx for each generation unit are assumed
to be constant. These demand curves are from an extremely short-run perspective. For
example, in a matter of hours, days, or weeks, generators can change their SO2 output
rate by switching to coal with a dierent sulfur content. Therefore, over a period that
allows for such a fuel change, the curves would be more elastic.
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Figure 4.9: The impact of CO2 price on SO2 and NOx emissions
63The numerical simulations show that by creating a regulatory policy, such as the
RGGI, that would impose a CO2 price on generators, the amount of SO2 and NOx emis-
sions would decrease. For example, if the SO2 permit price were $700 per tonne with
no CO2 price, imposing a CO2 price of $100 per tonne would reduce the quantity of
SO2 emission permits by about 10 percent. The price of CO2 similarly interacts with
NOx permit demand. Keeping the price of NOx permits at $2,000 while increasing the
CO2 price from $0 to $100 would reduce the quantity of NOx permit demanded by nine
percent. This results because the same generation units that produce the highest level
of CO2 emissions, i.e. coal-ﬁred generation, also produce the highest level of SO2 and
NOx. So, as the cost to generate electricity for CO2 increases, coal-ﬁred generation is
decreased, reducing emissions of all three pollutants.
Thus, it is clear that the creation of a regulatory policy dealing with CO2 has an
important impact on SO2 and NOx emissions. Assuming that the regulation of SO2 and
NOx is done through a cap and trade program (as is currently the case in the United
States) and the caps for each pollutant remained constant, the decrease in demand of
SO2 and NOx permits would drive the market price of these pollutants down.
Because SO2 and NOx are criteria pollutants whose impacts are most dramatic close
to where they are emitted, it is interesting to consider the amount of these pollutants
that are created in high population areas. New York City and Boston are the two largest
cities that can be most closely identiﬁed in this model network.20 Figure 4.10 shows
how SO2 and NOx emissions change in these two cities with various CO2 prices.
Of particular interest is that in New York City, SO2 and NOx emissions decrease
with CO2 price at ﬁrst, but then begin to increase between $50 and $100 per tonne.
Figure 4.11, which shows the generation by fuel type for various CO2 prices, reveals the
20Buses 74327 and 71797 are used to represent New York City and Boston, respectively.
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Figure 4.10: SO2 and NOx emissions in New York City and Boston
reason this happens. For each CO2 price, the bar on the left denotes the generation mix
when CO2 prices are applied to all generators in the model, while the bar on the right is
the case when CO2 prices are applied only to generators in the RGGI area.
In New York City, total fossil-ﬁred generation decreases as CO2 prices rise, but at
low CO2 prices. As the CO2 price continues to increase though, the predominant trend is
for oil-ﬁred generation to be removed and natural gas-ﬁred generation to be added. The
net SO2 and NOx emissions increase because the emissions from the natural gas-ﬁred
generators more than oset the decrease in emissions by removing oil-ﬁred generation.
In general, natural gas-ﬁred generation has relatively low SO2 emissions compared to
its NOx emissions. This explains why the SO2 emissions only modestly increase due
650
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Figure 4.11: Fossil-ﬁred generation in New York City and Boston
to the (very large, in the case of CO2 costs being applied to all generators) addition of
natural gas-ﬁred generation and the removal of a small amount of oil-ﬁred generation.
Due to natural gas-ﬁred generation’s larger emissions of NOx, the increase in emissions
is more dramatic.
InBoston, SO2 andNOx emissionsmonotonicallydecreasebecause, especiallycom-
pared to New York City, there is a large amount of coal- and oil-ﬁred generation that can
be removed as SO2 and NOx emissions prices increase. The increase in emissions as the
amount of electricity produced by natural gas-ﬁred generators increases does not exceed
the amount of SO2 and NOx emission reductions caused by removing coal- and oil-ﬁred
generation.
66Thus, the locational impacts of SO2 and NOx emissions, especially in high popula-
tion metropolitan areas such as New York City and Boston, should be taken into consid-
eration when creating an environmental program. This is even true for the creation of
CO2 programs, as there are related cross-eects from the emissions of CO2, SO2, and
NOx.
4.5.2 Methodological Selection
The methodological questions explored in these numerical simulations are the consid-
erations of transmission line constraints, the use of AC or DC models, and the use of a
seasonal availability algorithm.
Transmission Constraints and AC and DC Modeling
Consider the impact of enforcing transmission line constraints by looking at each in-
dividual transmission line under AC, DC, CO2 cost applied to all generators, and CO2
cost applied to the RGGI area generators only.21 In particular, Table 4.8 presents the
ﬂow over the transmission lines connecting the RGGI area with the non-RGGI area, as
a percentage above or below each line’s maximum capacity.
It is more important to consider the sign of the percentages (a positive number in-
dicates the ﬂow was over the line maximum and a negative number indicates the ﬂow
was below the line maximum), not the magnitude, as these three lines are not the only
lines connecting the RGGI area with the other RTO areas. Rather, these are the only
lines that have constraining line limits that connect the RGGI area with the other RTO
21Seasonal availability, emission costs to all generators by size, no drought, no reserve margin, SO2
=$700/tonne, and NOx =2,000/tonne.
67areas so electricity can cross RTO boundaries in many other ways beyond these three
transmission lines.
Table 4.8: Flow over inter-RGGI area RTO transmission lines, as a percentage above
(positive number) or below (negative number) the line maximum
Bus Line max CO2 price AC DC
From To (MW) ($/MWh) all RGGI all RGGI
1
PJM
74347
NYISO
1000
0 -41% -41% -82% -82%
3.51 -40% -33% -81% -62%
10 -40% -24% -80% -36%
25 -41% 2% -77% -1%
50 -47% 29% -81% 55%
100 -67% 55% -108% 160%
175 -99% 66% -200% 238%
250 -122% 68% -249% 270%
70002
ISO-NE
87004
Maritimes
730
0 -156% -156% -180% -180%
3.51 -156% -161% -179% -192%
10 -156% -172% -179% -200%
25 -156% -189% -174% -208%
50 -152% -211% -171% -217%
100 -146% -234% -156% -232%
175 -101% -241% -130% -236%
250 -56% -243% -103% -237%
79578
IESO
80031
ISO-NE
600
0 -210% -210% -359% -359%
3.51 -210% -213% -360% -370%
10 -209% -217% -361% -377%
25 -208% -223% -357% -384%
50 -206% -230% -355% -391%
100 -171% -237% -346% -395%
175 -131% -233% -281% -377%
250 -121% -233% -240% -369%
Only one of the lines, the line from bus 1 to 74347 connecting northeastern Penn-
sylvania in the PJM control area to Rockland County, New York in the NYISO control
area, ever exceeds its line limit. Furthermore, the ﬂows only exceed the limit for high
CO2 prices when the cost of CO2 is applied to generators in the RGGI area only.
Also consider the transmission lines that have constraining line limits inside the
68RGGI area. Table 4.9 indicates whether the line ﬂow exceeds the maximum for at least
one CO2 price.
Table 4.9: Whether line ﬂow exceeds the maximum for at least one CO2 price
Bus Line max AC DC
From To (MW) all RGGI all RGGI
5028 74347 1261 No No No No
5028 74327 1000 No Yes No Yes
71786 71797 1434 No No No No
71786 71797 1313 No No No No
73106 73110 1255 No No No No
73171 75050 301 No No No No
74316 75050 690 No No No Yes
74316 74327 2800 Yes Yes Yes Yes
74341 74344 1720 No No No No
74344 78701 1331 No No No No
74344 78701 1331 No No No No
75403 75405 1255 No No No No
75403 79581 1494 No No No No
77400 77406 1032 No No No No
77406 79583 1434 No No No No
78701 78702 1331 No No No No
78701 79581 1428 No No No No
79584 79800 1301 No Yes Yes Yes
Only four of the 18 intra-RGGI area transmission lines ever exceed their maximum
line limits. They are:
 the line from bus 5028 to 74327 connecting New Jersey to New York City,
 the line from bus 74316 to 75050 connecting Westchester to Long Island,
 the line from bus 74316 to 74327 connecting Westchester to New York City, and
 the line from bus 79584 to 79800 connecting Niagara Falls to Rochester.
The main result of considering ﬂows over the transmission lines is that due to the
69high demand for electricity, and the limited pathways for electricity to reach consumers,
all of the congested lines except one are in the greater New York City metropolitan area.
The only congested line in this reduced model of the electricity network that is not near
the New York City area is a transmission line connecting Niagara Falls, where low-cost
hydropower is produced, to a high-demand area in Rochester. Furthermore, the trans-
mission constraints are most important when the cost of CO2 is applied to generators in
the RGGI area only.
Now consider the dierences between AC and DC modeling. Figure 4.12 shows
both CO2 emissions and the cost of operating the system as a function of CO2 price,
predicted using the four modeling methods when the CO2 emission cost is applied to
all generators in the model.22 Each plotted point is a time-weighted mean of the sixteen
representative hours that are modeled. This ﬁgure shows that in most instances, these
aggregate results over the entire region can be quite similar across all of these modeling
methods (though CO2 emissions do vary by model).
As an example, an increasing CO2 price tends to cause a shift from coal-ﬁred gen-
eration units to gas-ﬁred generation units, which tend to be located closer to customers.
Therefore, if the CO2 price is imposed throughout the entire network, the change in the
operation of the power system that results from the CO2 price may not substantially
exacerbate transmission constraints.
In contrast, Figure 4.13 shows an example highlighting the impact the transmission
systemthatisselectedcanhavewhenCO2 regulationsareappliedtoonlytheRGGIarea.
This ﬁgure illustrates the predicted eects of the RGGI on CO2 emissions both inside
and outside the regulated region. For a CO2 price of $10/tonne, the AC model with
constrained transmission predicts the highest amount of CO2 in the RGGI area. The AC
22Seasonal availability, emission costs to all generators by size, no drought, no reserve margin, SO2
=$700/tonne, and NOx =2,000/tonne.
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Figure 4.12: Various modeling methods with CO2 emission costs to all generators
model with unconstrained transmission and DC model with constrained transmission
both predict about three percent less than the AC model with constrained transmission.
The biggest dierence is seen in the DC model with unconstrained transmission, which
predicts about 20 percent fewer emissions in the RGGI area than the AC model with
constrained transmission. All of the dierences between each of these predictions grow
as the CO2 price increases.
These dierences occur because of the restrictions imposed on the OPF problem by
each model. The AC model has more dispatch restrictions, such as voltage constraints,
than the DC model. Similarly, constrained transmission lines restrict the ﬂow of elec-
tricity over the grid. The numerical simulations show that the most restrictive model,
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Figure 4.13: Various modeling methods with CO2 emission costs to RGGI area genera-
tors
AC with constrained transmission, is the most expensive to operate and produces the
most CO2 emissions. On the other side, the least restrictive model, DC with uncon-
strained transmission lines, estimates the lowest operating costs and forecasts the least
CO2 emissions. Interestingly, enforcing only one of these constraints at a time yields
very similar results.
In general, the dierences between AC and DC models both with and without trans-
mission constraints are most poignant when the cost of CO2 emissions are not applied
to all generators in the model and instead are focused on particular locations, like the
RGGI area. In this case, the disparity between each model grows with the price per
tonne of CO2.
72Thus, when attempting to estimate the eects of policies that are regionally speciﬁc,
like the RGGI, Figure 4.13 illustrates the importance of depicting the electricity network
accurately (AC with line constraints) in order to estimate locational dierences.
Seasonal Availability
A seasonal availability constraint should be imposed on coal-ﬁred generation units in
this model to reﬂect actual operations realistically. The results of the numerical simu-
lations show that the seasonal availability algorithm plays an important role in shutting
down coal-ﬁred generation units when the costs of dispatching coal-ﬁred generation
becomes too expensive.
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Figure 4.14: Seasonal availability savings in each season
73To demonstrate the impact of the seasonal availability algorithm, consider two emis-
sion price scenarios,23 one with moderate emission prices24 and another with high emis-
sion prices.25
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Figure 4.15: Number of coal-ﬁred generators with negative proﬁt in each season
Figure 4.14 shows the dierence between the amount of savings, in terms of total
system operating cost, created by running the seasonal availability algorithm. The dif-
ference is signiﬁcant when the emission prices are high. In this example, the savings in
operating costs that are predicted by running the seasonal availability algorithm is about
$50 million per year when the emission prices are moderate and $1.4 billion per year
23AC, line constraints, emission costs to all generators by geography, emission costs to all generators
by size, no drought, no reserve margin.
24CO2 = $10/tonne, SO2 =$700/tonne, and NOx =2,000/tonne.
25CO2 = $250/tonne, SO2 =$1700/tonne, and NOx =5,000/tonne.
74when the emission prices are high.
The vast dierence in savings results from coal-ﬁred generators that are not prof-
itable when operated at low generation levels are being shutdown. Figure 4.15 shows
the dierence between the number of coal-ﬁred generators with negative proﬁts at mod-
erate and high emission prices. In most cases, at least 100 generators with negative proﬁt
are shutdown by the seasonal availability algorithm.
Thus, these simulations illustrate the importance of including a generator shutdown
mechanism in any model of the electric system operation that is intended to estimate the
operating, reliability, and cost consequences of environmental policies.
75CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The theoretical model described in Chapter 3 explores the interactions of electric relia-
bility and environmental regulation by comparing the social welfare maximizing solu-
tion to the competitive market solution. The main result is that after assuming a central
planner has set variables surrounding the transmission grid, complicating interdepen-
dencies in markets for criteria pollutants make achieving the socially optimal solution
unlikely. Markets for global pollutants can more easily achieve the socially optimal so-
lution due to the lack of these interdependencies. This result highlights the importance
of a “smart-grid” that disseminates price information to buyers and sellers in real-time
to reduce the cost of supplying reliable electricity to consumers.
The numerical simulations described in Chapter 4 represent a highly simpliﬁed
model of Northeastern North America. Yet, the complications of a full non-linear AC
electricity dispatch are introduced and the simulations yield the following results when
considering the RGGI environmental policy. Leakage seems to be an important issue for
the RGGI, as the modeled results show that most of the reduction in emissions inside the
RGGI area are countered by an increase in emissions outside the RGGI area. Further-
more, the cost of electricity to consumers inside the RGGI area will marginally increase
at the current RGGI allowance price. At much higher CO2 prices than present, customer
electricity prices are estimated to increase in both the RGGI and non-RGGI areas, but by
much more within the RGGI area. Unfortunately, due to leakage, these higher electric-
ity prices in the RGGI area do not result in much net CO2 reductions. Only a uniform,
region-wide CO2 regulation can achieve large reductions in CO2 emissions.
The industry as a whole will see an increase in proﬁts as a result of CO2 regulations,
though the increases are not uniform across all types of generation and also depend
76heavily on which generation units face the emission costs. Also, a drought that reduces
the amount of hydropower available for dispatch could lead to a signiﬁcantly higher
CO2 allowance price in the RGGI. With regards to the operating reserve margin, this
modeling shows that it has little short-run impact on total system operating cost or CO2
emissions when dierent reserve margins are applied uniformly over all generators.
Finally, the imposition of a CO2 price on generation units will signiﬁcantly impact
the demand for SO2 and NOx allowances under a cap and trade program. Furthermore,
the consequences of a particular environmental initiative are not monotonic. As an ex-
ample, the total generation of SO2 and NOx in large metropolitan centers, such as New
York City or Boston, can either increase or decrease with increasing CO2 prices depend-
ing on the level of CO2 price imposed. This varying result occurs because the emission
savings by reducing the generation from high SO2 and NOx emitting generation at low
CO2 prices is eventually overcome by the much larger increase in natural gas-ﬁred gen-
eration, with relatively lower SO2 and NOx emissions, at high CO2 prices.
From the perspective of the methodology used to simulate electric power grids, the
seasonal availability algorithm plays an important role in reducing the cost of operating
the system when considering high emission prices. AC and DC modeling, done with and
without transmission constraints, are most important when there is a regional disparity
between the application of emission costs.
While these results are useful, it is important to understand that these numerical
simulations are based on a spatial simpliﬁcation of the actual RGGI area and the North-
eastern North America electric power grid. Many provisions implemented under the
RGGI are not considered in these simulations. For instance, neither the ability to satisfy
some of the emission reduction requirements by purchasing osets nor multiple-year
control periods are modeled. Because this is not a general equilibrium model, neither
77demand response nor individual RGGI participating states’ use of RGGI auction rev-
enues to fund programs that help energy customers to improve their energy eciency,
an important, low-cost source of emission reductions, [4] are considered. Finally, the
ideal physical model of the electric grid would combine both thermal and voltage limits
that fully match the real system. Additionally, many more lines and buses would be
included.
Nevertheless, this research contributes to the economics and power systems litera-
ture by providing insights towards setting optimal environmental and electric reliabil-
ity standards, predictions of current environmental policies, and understanding of the
methodological dierences in power system modeling and therefore the extent of uncer-
tainty about estimated outcomes.
In future research, the theoretical model could be expanded to compare the socially
optimal and market solutions when electric reliability, global pollution, and criteria pol-
lution are all included in the same model. Also, the model could explore the socially
optimal solutions when the environmental and electric reliability agencies play a se-
quential and/or simultaneous game. This will provide a better understanding of how, in
practice, environmental and electric reliability regulations are often set. Finally, instead
of having the entire system regulated by a single environmental agency and a single
electric reliability agency, the system could be split to examine the optimal outcomes
when the regulatory oversight of the environmental and electric reliability agencies do
not perfectly intersect.
In the numerical simulations, added detail would increase the accuracy of the pre-
dicted results. For instance, building a dynamic general equilibrium model that allows
fossil fuel prices to ﬂuctuate, electricity demand response to changing prices, and in-
vestment in new generation (not just the removal as currently implemented with the
78seasonal availability algorithm). The physical grid could also become more detailed or
even expanded to include the entire Eastern interconnection.
Contingencies other than drought could be considered as well. For example, trans-
mission line contingencies could be modeled. Similarly, allowing the removal of a large
nuclear generator, as proposed in New York State, would provide a dierent type of
contingency to consider in the face of environmental regulation.
Furthermore, investigations into mathematically identifying portions of the trans-
mission grid that are “environmentally weak” could be conducted. This would be done
in an eort to relate transmission patterns to environmental issues by studying where the
transmission grid is most highly impacted by changes in environmental regulation.
Finally, when considering the impacts of criteria pollutants such as SO2 and NOx,
a detailed transport model could be built into the numerical simulations. This feature
would provide a more accurate understanding of how emissions from each generator
aect populations across entire regions, not just at the bus from which the criteria emis-
sions were emitted.
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CHAPTER 3 MATHEMATICS
A.1 Electric Reliability
A.1.1 Social Planner
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81The Lagrangian for this maximization problem is:
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A.1.2 Individual Consumer
Each individual consumer at location i has allocation of the resource ¯ yi so that each
consumer’s allocated wealth, mi is equal to ¯ yi. Consumer i solves the following utility
maximization problem.
max
xi;yi;
ui(xi;yi;)
3 ixi + yi + i  mi
The Lagrangian for this maximization problem is:
L = ui(xi;yi;) + (mi   ixi   yi   i)
83In order for endogenous variables x
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order conditions must be satisﬁed:
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Furthermore, the following ﬁrst order conditions for Lagrange multiplier  must be
satisﬁed at the optimal solution:
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84A.2 Global Pollutant and Electric Reliability
A.2.1 Social Planner
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85Re-arranging and substituting in equations yields:
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86The Lagrangian for this maximization problem is:
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In order for endogenous variables x
i, y
i, , , z
g
i , zr
i , w
i , and 
i to be optimal,
87the following ﬁrst order conditions must be satisﬁed:
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Furthermore, the following ﬁrst order conditions for Lagrange multipliers  , 
i, 
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A.2.2 Individual Consumer
Each individual consumer at location i has allocation of the resource ¯ yi so that each
consumer’s allocated wealth, mi is equal to ¯ yi. Consumer i solves the following utility
maximization problem:
max
xi;yi;;
ui(xi;yi;;)
3 ixi + yi +   + i  mi
The Lagrangian for this maximization problem is:
L = ui(xi;yi;;) + (mi   ixi   yi       i)
89In order for endogenous variables x
i, y
i, , and  to be optimal, the following ﬁrst
order conditions must be satisﬁed:
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Furthermore, the following ﬁrst order conditions for Lagrange multiplier  must be
satisﬁed at the optimal solution:
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A.3.1 Social Planner
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91Re-arranging and substituting in equations yields:
max
xi;yi;i;
z
g
i ;zr
i;w

i ;i
W(u1(x1;y1;1;);:::;uI(xI;yI;I;))
3 0 =  i(z
g
1;z
r
1;w

1;:::;z
g
I;z
r
I;w

I)   i; 8i
0 =
I X
j=1
Bijj   xi + Ri(z
g
i); 8i
0 = Ri(z
r
i)   Ri(z
g
i); 8i
0  G  
I X
j=1
w

j  
I X
j=1
yj  
I X
j=1
z
g
j  
I X
j=1
z
r
j
0  Ri(z
g
i) + Ri(z
r
i)   P
min
i ; 8i
0  P
max
i   Ri(z
g
i)   Ri(z
r
i); 8i
0  Ml +
I X
j=1
Cljj; 8l
0  Ml  
I X
j=1
Cljj; 8l
0 = 1
92The Lagrangian for this maximization problem is:
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A.3.2 Individual Consumer
Each individual consumer at location i has allocation of the resource ¯ yi so that each
consumer’s allocated wealth, mi is equal to ¯ yi. Consumer i solves the following utility
maximization problem:
max
xi;yi;i;
ui(xi;yi;i;)
3 ixi + yi + ii + i  mi
The Lagrangian for this maximization problem is:
L = ui(xi;yi;i;) + (mi   ixi   yi   ii   i)
95In order for endogenous variables x
i, y
i, 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 to be optimal, the following ﬁrst
order conditions must be satisﬁed:
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Furthermore, the following ﬁrst order conditions for Lagrange multiplier  must be
satisﬁed at the optimal solution:
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96APPENDIX B
TECHNICAL COMPUTATION INFORMATION
B.1 Computer details
The numerical simulations were run in parallel on 26 Gateway Model E-2600S com-
puters, each with a 3.40 GHz Intel Pentium D Processor and 896 MB of RAM. The
machines were running Microsoft Windows
R  XP Professional, Version 2002, Service
Pack 2 with MATLAB
R  version 7.4.0.287 (R2007a) and MATPOWER development
version “matpower-dev-2009-05-27.”
B.2 Simulation code
Due to the terms and conditions signed with Energy Visuals, Inc. the speciﬁc generator
data used to conduct the numerical simulations cannot be published or distributed. Nev-
ertheless, numerous MATLAB
R  functions and scripts were written in order to run the
numerical simulations that are not related to the speciﬁc Energy Visuals, Inc. data and
can be shared. Because the distributable software is thousands of lines of code, it is not
reproduced here. Contact the author to receive an electronic version of the code.
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